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Section 355 active business requirement:
What advice to give clients today
by JOHN W. LEE
Th e IR

in three Rulings has taken th e position that semices for the distributing

corporation performed through independent con tracto n could not satisfy the
active business requireme nt test of Section 355. Mr. L ee analyzes th e Rulings in
light of case law and legislative history that have in terp,'eted the Code's active
business test. H e concludes th at fu rt her court tests will be necessary before
th ere can be complete reliance upon active conduct by an indepen dent contractor.
E CTION

355 contains two safeguards

S against bail·out abuse : the "device"

test and th "active business" test. The
provision is inapplicable if the transaction was u ed principally as a "device"
for the distribution of the earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation,
the controlled corporation or both.
Moreover, immediately after the distribution both corporations must be engaged in the "active conduct of a trade
or business" that has been actively conducted for five years prior to the distribution.
The purpose underlying the active
business te t is to prohibit a corporation
from separating its surplus .in the form
of liquid assets from its operating as ets,
incorporating the liquid assets, and th en
distributing the subsidiary's stock to its
shareholders in anticipation of a future
stock sale or liquidation. The five-year
pre-distribution period keeps the dis·
tributing corporation from using liquid
assets to acquire, ju t before the distribution , a new and active business that can
be spun-off without any contraction of
old operating assets.1
An unanswered que tion was whether
the active business test was met if an
agent or independent contractor canied
out the major activities of the distributing corporation or of the controlled corporation whose stock was distributed.
Judicial authorities interpreting Sections
355,2 761 8 and 921 4 indicate that an
active business may be conducted

through an agent or possibly an independent contractor. Furthermore, uch a
conelu ion appears consistent with the
purpose of the active business test and
the device test as manifested by the
legislative hi tory of Section 355. On the
other hand, both Section 856(d)(3) (pertaining to REITs) and the Regulations
under Section 954(c) (3)(A) (pertaining
to . S. shareholders in "controlled foreign corporations") would seem to deny
active business status to rental real estate
if management and operational activi ties
are rendered through an independent
contractor. In three 1973 Rulings (73·
234, 73-236 and 73-237, 1973-1 CB 181 ,
183, 184) the IRS has provided a clarifi·
cation to the independent contractor
question.

Facts of recent R u lings
In R ev. Rul. 73-234, Y corporation, a
wholly owned subsidiary of X corpora·
tion, was engaged in a farm operation
for more than five years prior to th e pro·
posed spin·off of Y corporation. Tenant
farm ers (independent contractors) undertook the planting, rai ing, and harvesting of crops and breeding and raising of livestock in Y's farm operation. Y
employed a general maintenance man
for farm property and equipment and
A , who was the president and sole hare·
holder of X. A, an experienced farmer,
negotiated on Y's behalf the annual con·
tracts with the tenant farmers, hired
seasonal workers and mechanics, planned

all planting and harve ting of crops and
all livestock breeding and purchases.
Moreover, A was responsible for h andling sales of all crops and livestock and
for accounting to the tenant farmers for
their shares of the proceed . Y sup pl ied
all equipment and arranged for all
financing nece ary for its farm opera·
tions.
R ev. Rul. 73·237, i nvolved X corpora·
tion, a general on tractor in the con·
stTU tion industry, with a wholly owned
subsidiary actively engaged in the manu·
facture and ale of electrical equi pment.
The propo ed transaction consisted of
splitting off that ub idiary. X per·
formed through ev ral of its salaried
employees the following ac tivities: sub·
mitting bids; negotiating contracts with
principals and ubcontractors (independent contractor); purchasing or
lea ing equipm nt and supplies; and
sup rvising work of subcontractors to
determine whether they had completed
their work in conformity with con tract
specifications. The primary responsibility for the completion of each job fell
upon X.
In R ev. Rul. 73·236, X was an unincorporated tr ust taxable as a corporation . For over five years it h ad been engaged in two busin esses: (I) the sale of
real estate th at it had developed and
improved, and (2) the leasing of some
of th e buildings that it had constructed.
In a Section 351 tra nsaction, X tran ferred all its property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business to Y, a wholly owned and
newl y formed subsidiary, and th en spun
off the Y sto k. As part of one overall
plan, X transformed itself in to a R EIT
and thereafter engaged primarily in the
leasing of real estate p roperties, each of
which was managed and operated by an
independent c ntra tor. X al 0 retained
some undeveloped land that it plan ned
to develop in the fu ture in to rental
property which an independent contractor also would manage and operate.
The three Rulings announced the
arne rule: "Section 355 of th
ode, by
requiring that a trade or busine be
actively conducted connotes substantial
management and operational activi tie
directly carried on by the corporation
itself, and not the activities of other
ou tside the corporation, including inde·
pendent contractors. However, the fact
that a portion of a corporation's busi·
ness activities is performed by independent contractors will not preclude
the corporation from bing engaged in
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the active conduct of a trade or business,
if the corporation itself directly performs active and substantial management and operational functions."
In R ev. Ruls. 73-234 and 73-237, the
IRS ruled that since the spun-off subsidiary's farm activities in the former and
the distributing corporation's general
contracting activities in the latter included the direct performance by each
of "active and substantial management
and operational functions," apart from
those performed by the independent
contractors, each was engaged in the
active conduct of a trade or business. On
the other hand, Rev. Rul_ 73-236 concluded that because (1) the only business conducted by the REIT before and
after the spin-off was leasing real estate,
and (2) the conduct of such ren tal activities as a REIT precluded it from
directly performing substantial manage·
ment and operational activities, the
REIT was not engaged in the active
trade or business immediately after the
spin-off_ The conclusion that direct conduct excludes activities of others outside
the corporation, including indep ndent
contractors and probably uncompensated corporate officers,5 constitutes the
most important and controversial aspect of the Rulings. But the three Rulings also contains implications as to the
possible course of the long awaited revision by the Service of the active business
provisions of the 355 Regulations. 6

Active and substantial management
The performance of "active and substantial management and operational
functions" as a test for active conduct
set forth in the Rulings appears to be
an adoption of one of the tests contained
in Reg. 1.954-2 (d)(ii) (a) for determining
whether rents are derived in the active
conduct of a trade or business. These
Rulings, however, despite their seeming
abundance of facts which commonly are
thought to serve as guideposts to points
of emphasis in the Servjce's analysis,
add little flesh to the bare bones of the
active and substantial management and
operational functions test. Management
activities in both the farming (Rev. Rul.
73-234) and general contracting (Rev.
Rul. 73-237) operations entailed negotiations of contracts with the independent
contractors and overall planning responsibilities. As to operational activities, the
principal element in both Rulings was
the furnishing (by purchase or lease) of
equipment and supplies. It is probable,
however, that furnishin g equipment and
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supplies is of secondary importance to
rendering management decisions and
certainly is not the sine qua non of
carrying on active and substantial management and operational activities. Management decisions and participation are
essential factors in a similar test contained in an exception to the Section
1402 exclusion of real estate rental in·
come from the term self-employment
earnings. In that context, the IRS declared in Rev. Rul. 57-58, 1957-1 CB 270
that physical work and management decisions are the principal factors to be considered and that furnishing equipment
and supplies or advancing funds for the
expenses of the operation qualify only
as additiol1o(ll factors to be considered in
borderline cases.
The "active and substantial management and operational functions" criterion appears closely related, if not
identical, to a Section 355 active business definition promulgated in Rafferty,
452 F.2d 767 (CA-l, 1971), cert. den. ,
wherein the First Circuit stated that an
active business consisted of entrepreneurial actlvlt1es quantitatively and
distinguishing corporate operations from
mere investments. While Rafferty did
not further delineate this test, cases decided under Code provisions not containing the qualification "active" but in
which the result depended on whether
the taxpayer was engaged in a "trade or
business" have drawn a distinction between business and investment activities.
Such a distinction has turned on whether
only the taxpayer receives the benefits of
his investment as opposed to whether he
creates a market or provides services to
another;7 when only the taxpayer stands
at the end of the economic chain, he is

deemed to be engaged in investment
activities. A comparison of a real estate
dealer with a trader in securities illustrates this distinction. The trader in
securities is not a middleman in the distribution of securities; rather he resells
to the same class of persons from whom
he buys, i.e., brokers. The fact that the
trader does not create a market renders
his sales activities passive, and thus he
qualifies only as an investor. A dealer in
real estate, on the other hand, develops
a market and sells to customers, not
back to another dealer as a trader would,
and thus the dealer engages in a trade
or business. Just as trading in securities
does not constitute a business, the management of one's own securities is not a
business for tax purposes because services are not provided to others; such
services are rendered or goods are sold
by the business activities of the corporation, a separate entity, whose securities
the investor holds; and the corporation's
business activities are not attributed to
its shareholders. In contrast, the management of improved rental real estate
involves the provisions of services to the
tenant, e.g., renting, maintaining and
improving the premises.S Comparing
ownership of securities with ownership
of real estate from tlle point of view of
the owner's activities, it may be noted
that nothing further need be done in
the case of securities in order to realize
income, but further action is required in
the case of real estate_ The latter will
produce no income unless rented, used,
or sold; thus, an owner of rental real
estate is not a mere passive investor but
instead is engaged in a trade or business. s In short, the entrepreneurial activities approach focuses on whether the

W. E. Gabriel Fabricatio-n. Co .. 42 TC 545 (1964),
Massee, "Section 355: Disposal of Unwanted

IuLid. A recurring iss ue in the Case la.w 0,1 Section
355 has been whether the direct conduct criterion
is met where corpora.te officers are not paid.
• Rev . Rul 64-147, 1964-1 CB (Part I) 136.
'See, 6.g., DuPo-n.t, 308 U.S. 488, (1940); Mev .... ,
TCM 1971-268.
• The Second Circuit in Pinchot, 113 F.2d 718
(CA-2, 19(0), held that a rental agent's a.c thrities
in executing leases. renting prop erties , collecting
rents. supervising repairs. paying takes, mort..
gage inter.est, insurance premiulnS, and executing
sales were considerable, continuous, and regular
and thereby constituted engaging in a business
beca.use they went beyond the scope of mere O"l\rnership of re.al property or the receipt of income from
real property. The Pinchot approach h.... been
widely followed_ Re". Rul. 18-522, 1913-2 CB 226.
• Cf_ Cooper Tire & Rubb ... Co. Empwll"e'. R etiroment Fund. 86 TC 96, (1961), aff'd. 306 F .2d 20
(CA-6, 1962), dealing with the leasing of tangible
personal property under Section 512(a); see also
M"1I"'~' ,",pro. note 7.
,. See Rev. Rul. 73-525, 1973-2 CB 311: De Amodio.
34 TC 894 (1960), aff'd. 299 F.2d 623 (CA-S 1962);
Herbert, 30 TC 26 (1958), acq.; L6wenh4upt, 20
TC 151 (1953), affd. per cur .• 221 F.2d 227 (CA10,1955).

1

M(l.

Assets in Connection with a

Reorganiza.tion/~
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Ta", L . Rev. 439 (1961); BITTKEft & EUSTICE, Federal Inc""",,, Ta",ation of Corpo.,.ation~ and ShMehold"".., Boston, 1911, Hl3.05.
• See Rafjorty, 452 F.2d 767 (CA-l, 1971). c ...t .
den.; Mwrd. King, 458 F.2d 245 (CA-6, 1972); W.
E. Gabriel Fabricatio-n. Co., .... pTa.
• Reg. 1.761-1(a) (1956) provid ... that ten.a nts in
common may be partners if they aeli1!ely carry
on a trade or busin .... and divide the profits thereof. For example, a partnership e.xista if co-own e'r'S
o·f an apartment building lease space and provide
services to the occupants albeit through an o.gent.
Id. Th .. active business t ... t is satisfied by regular
a.nd eontinuous management and rental activities.
Varne.., TCM 1978-97; Roth_berg, 48 TC 869
(1967)_
• See, e.g., Int'!. Canadian Corp., 30S F.2d 520.
(CA-9, 1962); United Stat"" Gyp ....m Co .. 304
F.Supp. 627. (DC TIt., 1969), rev'd. on other
grounds, 452 F .2d 445 (CA-7, 1971); BarberGreene Americas, Inc., 35 TC 365 (1960).
• While the Rulings do not expressly mention uncompensated corporate officers. they do mention
that the corporate officers involved therein wete
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corporation creates a market or provides
services to another.
The non ection 355 deci ions distinguishing between business activities and
investment activities al 0 illuminate the
problem of whether a business may be
actively conducted through an independent contractor_The cited cases involving
agent-operated realty impute the agent's
management activities to the owner of
the real estate. 10
Direct conduct test

The true significance of the three Rulings lies in their adoption of the direct
conduct test. Support for their application of the direct conduct concept also
may be found in the Section 954 model
for the active business test. Under that
Section the "active business" safe haven
of Reg. 1.954-2(d)(1) (ii) (a) is barred if
the management and operational functions are performed by a real estate
management firm, i.e., an independent
contractor. Conversely, Reg. 1.954-2(d)
(2) (ii)(c) provides that where a controlled foreign corporation acts as its
own rental agent for the leasing of
offices in an office building which it has
purchased and employs a substantial
staff to perform other management and
maintenance functions, the rents are
derived from the active conduct of a
trade or business.
Similarly, the REIT provi ions in Section 856(d)(3) exclude amounts received
with respect to r al property from the
term "rents from real property"where the
REIT "furnishes or renders services to
the tenants of such property or manages
or operates such propeny, other than
through an independent contractor."
Section 856 does not use the term "active conduct of a trade or business."
Nevertheless, as noted by R ev. Rul. 73236, the legislative history to the Section
states that the REIT restrictions were
intended to limit the "pass through" to
[John W . Lee, of the Virginia Bar, is a
partner in the Richmond law firm of
Hirsch/er, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox &
Allen. Previously, he was attorney-advisor
to the Tax Court. A frequent contributor to THE Jo RNAL OF TAXATIO , TIle
Tax Law Review, The Tax Lawyer and
other prOfessional publications, Mr. Lee
has written a Tax Management Portfolio on fiduciary responsibilities under
ERISA. This article is an up-ta-date
adaptation of an article that appeared
in the Summer 1974 issue of the Washington and Lee Law Review.]
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shareholders of taxable income that was
clearly passive income from real estate
investments, as contrasted with income
from the "active operation of business
involving real estate."
In sharp distinction to the pOSitIOn
taken in the three Rulings, Section 856,
and the Section 954 Regulations that a
trade or business actively conducted
means activities directly carried on by
the corporation and excludes the activities of others outside the corporation,
the Tax Court squarely held in W. E.
Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 TC 545
(1964), acq., that Section ~55 does not
require the actively conducted business
to have been directly conducted by
either the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation for purposes
of the five year pre-distribution active
business requirement. In Gabriel the
distributing corporation, Boiler, had
operated three lines of businesses: (1)
manufacturing boilers, (2) fabricating
structural and plate steel, and (3) manu·
facturing canopy covers for tractors. In
addition it owned all the stock in a subsidiary real estate corporation, Engineering. A split-off was contemplated in
which the fabricating and canopy businesses would be transferred to . ngineering whose stock would then be distributed to one of the Boiler shareholders,
Gabriel, in exchange for all of his stock
in the latter. About 14 months prior to
the actual consummation of the split-off,
Boiler transferred all of the fabrication
and canopy assets to Gabriel in a transaction denominated by the Tax Court
as a loan. Subsequently, as an integral
part of the distribution to him of the
stock in the subsidiary Engineering,
Gabriel transferred these assets to Engineering. The Tax Court held that immediately after the split-off Boiler was
engaged in active conduct of the boiler
business which it had actively conducted
throughout the five.year pre·di tribution
period. Likewise, Engineering was engaged in the active conduct of the fabrication and canopy businesses immediately after the distribution. However,
the court found that Boiler had ceased
to engage in the conduct of the fabrication and canopy businesses when it
loaned their assets to Gabriel.
The Commissioner asserted that in
order to meet the active business requirements, Boiler or Engineering must
have conducted the fabricating and canopy businesses or acquired them in a
tax-free transaction during the five-year
pre.distribution period. Gabriel main-

tained, on the other hand, that neither
the distributing corporation nor the controlled corporation had to have conducted such businesses during that fiveyear period. It contended "that the
trade or business could have been conducted during this period by some third
party, such as a corporation not related
to either the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation, or even by a
sole proprietorship." The Tax Court
agreed that Gabriel's operation of the
fabrication and canopy businesses in the
form of a sole proprietorship during the
fourteen months prior to the di tribution of the Boiler stock could be added
to the period during which Boiler conducted these businesses. Con equently,
the court found that the five-year predistribution active business requirement
of Section 355 had been satisfied.
The pre-distribution requirement of
Section 355(b)(2)(B)-"such trade or business had been actively conducted
throughout the five-year period ending
on the date of the distribution"-does
not indicate by whom the business must
have been actively conducted. On the
other hand, the post-distribution active
business requirement of Section ~55(b)
(I) provides that a non-recognition separation is available only if "the distributing corporation, and the ontrolled corporation . . . is (sic) engaged immediately after the distribution in the active
conduct of a trade or business. . . ."
Apparently, then, only the post-distribution test requires that both the distributing and controlled corporations themselves engage in the active conduct of a
trade or business. Indeed, in Gabriel,
the Tax Court acknowledged that at the
time when Boiler, the distributing corporation, loaned the fabrication and
canopy businesses to Gabriel, it ceased
to engage in the conduct of su h businesses.
The three Se tion 355 Rulings do not
appear to distinguish between the predistribution and post·distribution active
business prerequisites in applying their
direct conduct requirement. Indeed,
Rev. Rul. 73-236, which considers the
REIT, would seem to be limited on its
facts to the post-distribution active business test. The other two Rulings clearly
apply the direct conduct criterion to
activities carried on during the five-year
pre-distribution period. A blanket application of a direct conduct requirement
to both pre.distribution and post-distribution busin ss directly onflicts with
the holding of W. E. Gabriel Fabrica-
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tion Co. and it thus se ms erroneous.
The post-di tribution active business
requirement, unlike the pre-distribution
active business requirement, apparently
does demand that the distributing and
controlled corporations directly operate
their respective businesses immediately
after the distribution _ By comparison
with Gabriel, the Tax Court in Morgenstern, 56 TC 44 (1971), interpreted a
provision of Section 346(b)(1), which is
virtually identical with the Section 355
post-distribution active business requirement, since under the fonner Section a
distribution in partial liquidation, in
order to be worthy of capital gains
treatment, must be attributable to the
distributing corporation's ceasing to
conduct a trade or business that has
been actively conducted throughout the
five-year period immediately before the
distribution. l l In Morgenstern, a parent
corporation controlled a subsidiary in
which it owned 67% of the stock. In a
partial liquidation the parent distributed this 67% interest in a pro rata exchange to its shareholders, the taxpayers,
for some of their stock. The subsidiary
was liquidated shortly thereafter; until
that date it had been actively engaged
in the conduct of its business for more
than five years. The taxpayers contended that since the parent controlled
the subsidiary through its 67% stock
ownership, it might be said to have
actively conducted the subsidiary'S business_ The Tax Court correctly pointed
out that a corporation is a separate and
distinct entity from its shareholders and,
thus, under fundamental tax principles.
a parent corporation does not conduct
its subsidiary's bu iness. Furth nnore, it
concluded that the distribution in partial liquidation must be attributable to
cessation of the conduct of an active
trade or business by the distributing corporation, and that the terminated business must have been "operated directly"
by the parent corporation in order for
the liquidation to escape dividend treatment. In reaching its decision, the Morgenstern court relied upon the legislative history of Section 346.12
Clearly the distributing corporation
for purposes of Section 346(b)(I) need
not have conducted the active business
throughout the entire five-year pre-distribution period, but at the time it
ceases to conduct the business it must
be engaged in the active conduct of such
business. Thus, this Section has an implicit requirement that immediately
prior to the termination of the business

the distributing corporation must be
engaged in the active conduct of the
terminated business and the retained
business_
Since the Morgenstern-Court interpreted the phrase "engaged in the active
conduct" to mean "operated directly,"
the Section 355 requirement that the
post-distribution distributing and controlled corporations must be "engaged"
in the active conduct of a trade or business immediately after the distribution
by analogy would also appear to
demand that such corporations operate
directly their respective businesses immediately after the distribution. This
conclusion is supported by the finding
in Gabriel that the distributing corporation "ceased to engage in the conduct of
. __ [the split-off) businesses" 14 months
prior to the split-off. Unfortunately,
Gabriel and Morgenstern offer little
guidance to the meaning of "direct"
conduct. Indeed, since the narrow holding in Morgenstern was that a parent
corporation does not engage in the
active conduct of, i.e., operate directly,
the business of its controlled subsidiary,
Morgenstern literally requires no more
than that the active business be owned
by the taxpayer and not by another
separate and distinct entity. Similarly, a
narrow reading of Gabriel indicates only
that a corporation is no longer engaged
in the conduct of a business after it has
loaned the assets to another_
In contrast to the premise of the three
Rulings that it is the term "active conduct" which connotes direct operation
by the corporation, Gabriel and Morgen.
stern clearly establish that it is the verb
"engaged" and not the phrase "active
conduct" which mandates direct operation. Sections 355(b)(2)(B) and 346(b)(1)
both set forth a pre-distribution active
business requirement that speaks of a
trade or business which "has been
actively conducted throughout the fiveyear period." On the other hand, Section 355(b)(1)(A) requires that the distributing and controlled corporations
be "engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a
trade or business;" and the court in
Morgenstern read into Section 346(b)(I)
a requirement that immediately prior to
the distribution in partial liquidation
the distributing corporation must be
engaged in the active conduct of at least
two businesses. In both Section 355 and
346 the pre-distribution active business
requirement does not demand direct
operation by the distributing corpora-
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tion,lS Convers ly, the post-distribution
requirement of Section 355(b)(I)(A) and
the requirement of ceasing to conduct a
trade or business immediately before
distribution under Section 346(b)(I) do
appear to require direct operation. The
apparent reason for the requirement of
direct conduct in these latter instanc s
is that only here does the statutory
langu~ge mandate that the distributing
corporation be "engaged" in the active
conduct of a trade or business.
While the various trade or business
Cod!! sections including active business
provisions use a variety of verbs, the
cases generally use the tenninology of
engaging in a trade or business without
regard to the precise wording of the
statute. The most common examples are
cases in which a court in considering
the term "trade" or "business" in conjunction with one verb interchangeably
cites a case in which the term, taken
from another Code provision, is used
with another verb. For instance, in
Schwam" 24 C 733 (1955), the Tax
Court in applying the net operating
loss privision of the 1939 Code, cited
Gilford, 201 F.2d 735 (CA-2, 1953) for
the principle that operation of rental
property by a taxpayer through an
agent does not prevent the taxpayer
from being regularly engaged in the
business. Accordingly, while "engaged
immediately after the distribution in the
active conduct of a trade or business"
probably requires direct conduct by the
corporation, the case law content of th
verb "engaged" teaches that such con duct through an agent should not prevent the corporation from being directly
engaged in the active conduct of that
trade or business. A reading of "direct
conduct" as requiring only that the economic risk of loss in the actively conducted business in question must rest
with the corporation that seeks to
qualify as engaged in the active condu t
of such business (so that the active business is its own and not that of another
entity) would preserve the viability of
the Gabriel and Morgenstern precedents
without conflicting wiili the earlier authorities which accept engaging in a
trade or business through an agent. For
while Gabriel and Morgenstern would
appear to require that the post-distribu11 Reg. 1.846-1 (c) provides that t.he tenn "active
conduct of a trade or bUBiness " has the same
meaning as in Reg. 1.355-1 (·c ).
.. S. Rep't. No. 1622, Sad Congo 2d Sess 262 (1954).
,. W. E. G..briel F ..brica.ti<m Co., supra. note 1
(5""tion 366); S. Rep't. No. 1622, ....pr.. (Section
346).
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tion active businesses be directly operated by the distributing and, in the case
of Section 355, controlled corporations,
neither case speaks to the question of
whether conduct through an independent contractor constitutes direct conduct. Rather, Gabriel held that the distributing corporation ceased to conduct
the plit-off business when the distributing corporation loaned the assets to
one of its shareholders, and Morgenstern held that the distributing corporation did not engage in the active conduct of it 67%-owned subsidiary's business. In both cases the economic risks of
the business in question obviously did
not rest with the disu·ibuting corporation.

Direct conduct, independent contractors
The conclusion in the three Ruling
that active conduct for purposes of Section 355 connotes activities directly Carried on by the corporation itself and not
the activities of others outside the corporation (i.e., independent contractors) ap·
pears to be based on an overt analogy to
Section 856(d) and a covert analogy to
Reg. 1.954-2(d)(ii)(a). These analogies,
however, may be less than perfect. For
example, neither of the latter provisions
accords active business status to rental
transactions with related parties. 14 Yet
in King, 458 F.2d 245 (CA-6, 1972), the
Sixth Circuit implicitly rejected the position, adopted by the Tax Court below,
that relatedness precludes active business. Similarly, Rafferty contains dicta
resting on the premise that a spun-off
corporation dealing only with related
entities can be engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business. Furthermore, in applying its two-part definition
of the active business test ("entrepreneurial endeavors" and "objective indicia"), the Rafferty-Court noted that the
spun-off corporation did not pay salaries
and did not employ independent contractors. The inescapable inference is
that employment of independent contractors would have constituted objective indicia of corporate operations from
mere investments.
The legislative history of the active
business rule, as interpreted by the Tax
ourt in Coa.dy, 33 T 771 (1960), afJ'd.
per CU1". 289 F.2d 490 (CA-6, 1961).
reveals that its function is to prevent the
tax-free separation of active and inactive
assets into active and inactive corporate
entities. Coady involved a split.off in
which a single construction business was
horizontally divided; that is to say, part
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of its construction contracts, equipment,
and cash was dropped down into a subsidiary, the stock of which was then distributed to one of the parent's shareholders in exchange for all of his stock
in the parent. The Commissioner in reliance on Reg. 1.355-I(a) maintained that
Section 355 did not apply to the division
of a single business. A divided Tax
Court invalidated that portion of the
Regulations, reasoning that "as long as
the trade or business which has been
divided has been actively conducted for
five years preceding the distribution ,
and the resulting businesses (each of
which in this case, happens to be half
of the original whole) are actively con ducted after the division, we are of the
opinion that the active business requirements of the statute have been complied
with."
Clearly an independent contractor's
performance of the requisite active and
substantial management and operational
functions would not change active assets
into inactive ones. The harder question
is whether the status of the performer of
the services determines the status of the
corporation. Moreover, the test under
Section 921(2) for determining if the
corporation derives the requisite income
from the active conduct of a trade or
business where the activities are conducted by a related party for a management fee, i.e., wheth er the corporation
bears the economic risk of the activities,
was echoed in Maple, 440 F.2d 1055
(CA-9, 1971).
Congress also seems to have intend d
that the status of the assets would determine the status of the corporation for
purpo~es of Section 355(b), for the Senate Finance Committee apparently used
the terms "assets" and "corporation"
interchangeably in the legislative history
of that provision.15
Since this legislative history do sn't
mention the status of the performer of
the services and refers to the corporation and its assets synonymously, it may
be inferred that Congress did not intend
that the corporate utilization of an independent contractor to conduct an active
business should render either the corporate entity or its business assets ina tive.
Furthermore, the exclusion of independent contractor activities from direct
active conduct is not mandated by the
legislative history of the "device" clause.
Under Section 355(a)(1)(B) the shareholder must show that the distribution
of stock in the controlled corporation
was not used principally as a "device"

for the distribution of earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation
or of the controlled corporation or both.
This clause is derived from 1939 Code
Section 112(b)(1 I) which also introduced
the post-distribution active business test.
In that Section, the device clause was
designed to prevent the bail-out of earnings and profits through the separation
of surplus corporation assets, or properties acquired with such surplus, from the
operating assets that had generated such
surplus.
The active busin ss t st wa intended
to supplement the device clause by precluding (1) tax-free status of a spin-off in
which a corporation was intended to be
liquidated, and (2) a drop down of
liquid assets into a sub idiary in anticipation of a delayed future stock sale or
redemption.16 The 1954 Code added the
five-y ar pre-distribution active conduct
requirement to assure that such surplus
was not used during the five years prior
to the distribution to acquire the spunoff business. Th Tax Court in Gabriel
had surmised that the predistribution
active business rule seemed to be a legiSlative rule of thumb designed to provide some assurance that the spun-off or
split-off corporation would not be liquidated or sold hortly after the distribution. Such assurance apparently arose
from the belief that if the business were
continuously conduct d for five years it
would be profitable and, therefore, not
lightly abandoned. The Gabriel-Court
concluded that a business conducted
actively by someone other than the di tributing or controlled corporation
would still fulfill this purpose.
Conduct of an active business through
an independent contractor would not
open the door to a drop down of liquid
assets;17 nor would such conduct lend
itself to a siphoning off of surplus without contraction of operating assets. It is
possible, however, that an active business so conducted might be more readily
salable after the corporate separation,
since continuity of manag ment, often a
significant factor in acquisitions of going
concerns, could be preserved more easily
than where the key management employees were selling stockholders or
employees of the retained corporation.
Such analysis would appear more properly a part of the device test than the
active business te t. The device test,
however, does not stop with a consideration of the salability of assets but goes
on to consider whether their retention
is necessary to the other corporation or
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their disposition would thwart shareholder or corporate business purposes.
Thus, the presence of independent contractors is not determinative under the
device test.
In summation, the scant Section 355
precedent and the purpose of the active
business and device tests indicate that
conduct of an active business through
an independent contractor should not
be a factor under the active business
prerequisite but should be among the
factors to be considered under the
device test. Since the 1978 Rulings
reach a contrary conclusion, a definitive
answer must await litigation.
Validity of the Rulings

The active conduct requirements of
the performance of substantial management and operational functions and the
prerequisite of direct operation as to the
post-distribution active bu in ess which
the 1973 Rulings set forth would in
general seem to be sound. The difficult
issue however, is whether such direct
conduct for purposes of Section 355 precludes performance by others outside
the corporation, particularly independent COntractors. The Section 954 and
REIT analogies would answer this question affirmatively. However, the foliowing con iderations militate against such
a conclusion: (I) the analogies of the
Section 761 R egulation s, the Section 921
authorities, and the construction of the
verb "engaged" in the trade or bu iness
case; (2) the implication of s vera I Se tion 355 decisions; and, most signifi.
cantly, (3) the purpo e of the active busi·
ness and devi e tests of Sect ion 355. Th e
analogies arising from a onsideration of
cctions 761 , 921 and cas s construing
the phrase "engaging in a trade or busine " focus on a distinction between
busine and invcstm nt a livities.1 8
Especially significant, is the fact that
trade (or busine s) and investment activities have long constituted under the
case law mutually exclusive terms as to
individual taxpayers, so that an individual could not deduct the expenses of
his investment activities under Section
162 since they were not incurred "in
carrying on any trade or business." Instead Section 212, applicable only to individuals, was enacted to permit the deduction by individuals of non-business
or investment expenses. However, Section 212 was not extended to corporations because the phrase "trade or business" in their case was apparently
thought broad enough to encompass in-
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vestment aCtiVIties, pennitting such expenses to be deducted under Section
162. Accordingly, it is most probable
that wherever Congress has imposed an
"active" business test upon corporations,
it intended no more than to distinguish
activities that in the case of individuals
would give rise to the deduction of
trade or business expenses under Section
162 from those that would give rise to
non-business expenses deductible only
under Section 212. In short, since
"trade or business" in the case of a corporation encompasses both business activities and investment activities, a qualifying phrase beyond just "trade or business" had to be used when Congress
meant to preclude favorable tax treatment to corporations with only investment activities. Therefore, an "active"
trade or business as applied to a corporation would be equivalent to a "trade
or business" as applied to an individual,
but would be a narrower term than
"trade or business" as applied to a corporation since the latter application
also encompasses investment activities.
The foregoing analysis contradicts the
position of the Tax Court that cases
which are decided under "trade or business" provIsions not containing the
qualification "active" are not authority
upon the question of what constitutes
the active conduct of a trade or business; and that to hold othenvise would
be to divest the word "active" of all
meaning.19 The non-Tax Court ection
355 decisions2 0 and even Tax Court
decisions under active business provisions other than Section 355 21 do not
hesitate to rely upon cases decided
under Code sections not containing the
qualification "active." Certainly, the
function of the active business term in
Section 921-to disqualify corporations
that receive investment income rather
than business income-supports the conclusion that the term "active" refers to
business, as distinguished from invest-

roent, income. Furthermore, the term
"passive" (inactive) income is frequently,
used to refer to investment income in
the Code. Consequently, it would seem
that the function of the active business
requirement in Section 355-to preclude
the tax-free separation of active and inactive assets into active and inactive COTporate entities-meshes with the above.
By contrast, the active business elements of Section 954 and 856, which
were apparently utilized as analogies by
the drafters of the three rulings, on the
surface conRict with the foregoing analysis since they clearly require more than
trade or business in the case of an individual taxpayer;22 yet these two sections
are also rooted in the distinction between business income and passive investment income. According to the Senate Finance Committee Report, the foreign personal holding income (FPHC
income) test of Section 954(c) was utilized because Congre s saw "no need to
maintain the deferral of U. S. tax where
the investments are portfolio types of
investments, or where the ompany is
merely passively receiving investment
income."28 The Finance Committee described FPHC income as, generally
speaking, passive in character. On the
other hand, Congress did not want to
include income arising in connection
with certain actual business activities.
Thus it provided in Section 954(c)(1I)
"that rents and royalties received from
an unrelated person and derived from
the active conduct of a trade or business
will not be considered foreign personal
holding company in come." Nevertheless,
neither this legislative history nor Section 954(c) itself makes reference to ex·
clusion of the activities of an independent contractor in applying the active
business test. Thus, Section 954(c) does
not conflict with the view that "active"
business for a corporation means no
more than "trade or business" in the
case of an individual. Rather the ind -

.. Regs. 1.954-2 (d) (1)(i) (1964) and 1.856-4(b)

a l"".or to a related corporation would constitute a
tra.de or business activity. E.tate of PaT3kel.ky.
Itltpra note 20. Moreover. recent Section 356 CRse
law clearly holds that s uch activities constitute an
active trade or business. Accordingly, one must
conclude that in Sections 964 (e) (8) and 866(d) '
(3) Congr""s was adding a requirement not Inherent in the concept 01 active conduct of a trade
or business.
"" S. Rep't. No. 1881, 7th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962) .
.. See Meyer, Active busines3 requirement of 855
eaaed but E&P bail-out provisi<>n. tightened, 48
JTAX 270 (November, 1976) .
• Compare Coad1l, 88 TC 771 (1960), afl"d. 289
F.2d 490 (CA-6, 1961) with R ev. Rul. 64-147,
1964-1 CB (part 1) 136, and Raffertl/, 452 F.Zd 767
(CA.1, 1971), .ert. den., with R ev. Rul. 75-160,
IRB 1976-18, 17.

(2).
,. S. Rep't. No. 1622, ....pra note 12 at 60-51.

1. Massee, "Section 355: Dispo.ml of Unwanted
Asset in a Reorganization" 8'Upra note 1.
If the business i. active, tbe assets presumably
are also acti ve and thus are not prone to be
dropped down and liquidated.
,. Varner. Itl<p.-a note 3; Tnt'l Can.adin" Corp ..
....pra note 4.
t. K ing, 66 TC 700 (1972) • .-",,'d. 458 F.Zd 245
(CA-6, 1972); see also EUiot, 32 TC 283 (1969).
to Estate of Par3h./aku. 303 F.2d 14 (CA-2, 1962)
(dealing with the 1939 Code predcC8sor to Section
366); Hans<m, 338 F. Supp. 602 (DC Mont., 1971).
It See e.g., Rothenb • .-g, supra note 3;Varner, 81Lp.-a
note 3.
.. The Second Circuit has indicated that acting as
11
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pendent contractor innovation first
appears in the Section 954 Regulations
and quite possibly is patterned after
Section 856(d)(3).
Therefore it appears that the analogies allowing active conduct through
independent contractors may be relied
upon in Section 355 cases despite the
three Rulings. While this conclusion
might be doubtful if only the active
business analogies are considered, it
seems buttress d by the implications of
the Rafferty, King, Hansen and Gabriel
cases and the purposes ascribed to the
Section 355 active business and device
tests, as well as the meaning Congress
apparently intended to ascribe to the
active condu t of a trade or business by
a corporation.
The criticism of the "direct conduct"
test of Rev. Ruls. 73·234, 73·236, and
73-237 is founded in large part upon the
tenor of, and radiations from, Rafferty.
In R ev. Rut. 75-160, IRB 1975-18,7,24 the
Service announced that it would dispose
of cases involving the active trade or
business requirement of Section 355(b)
in accordance with Rafferty. The factual
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backgrounds of that Ruling, however,
involve only functio nal divisions. Subsequently, in Rev. Rul. 75-337, IRB 197532, 10, the Service reaffirmed its reliance
on business purpose in addition to device, notwithstanding the contrary thrust
of Rafferty. Thus, the Service's partial
concession to Rafferty should be viewed,
at this tUne, as a limited acceptance
solely of functional divisions under
Section 355 and cannot yet be read as
an undermining of the "direct conduct"
test. The author has received a private
letter ruling issued after Rev. Rul. 75160 in which the Service refused to fol·
Iowan even clearer implication of Rafferty - that operation of owner-occupied
real estate could constitute an active
business. In short, it would appear that
more litigation will be necessary before
the Service abandons the positions taken
in the active business Regulations (such
as the requirement of independent production of income and prohibition of
active business statuS to owner-occupied
real estate) and glosses that it has placed
upon such Regulations such as the "direct conduct" requirement.2~

*

Tax avoidance is still the ultimate issue
in Sec. 531 accumulated earnings disputes
cases are fought on the basis
M of 531whether
a corporation's earnOST

ings were accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the business. However,
in order for the penalty tax to be imposed, it also must be shown that such
accumulation was for the purpose of
avoiding tax on the shareholders. This
latter factor was the key to the taxpayer's victory in Starman Investment, Inc.,
534 F.2d 834 (CA-9, 1976). In the following paragraphs, Charles P. Duffy, a part·
ner in the Portland, Oregon law firm of
Duffy, Georgeson, Dahl Xc Kekel, and
the taxpayer's attorney in Starman,
points out the significance of tbis approach in defending against IRS imposition of the tax.
The principal thrust of The Donruss
Company, 393 U.s. 297 (1969), decision
was that, in order for a taxpayer to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness contained in Section 533(a), "the
taxpayer must establish by the preponderance of the evidence that tax avoidance with respect to shareholders was
nOt 'one of the purposes' for the accumulation of earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business." The Su-

preme Court h eld that tax avoidance
need not be the dominant, impelling or
controlling purpose for the accumulation and that the taxpayer must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that
tax avoidance with respect to its shareholders was not "one of the purposes"
for the accumulation of earnings beyond
the reasonable needs of the business.
I t is well to keep in mind the fact
that a corporation may accumulate earnings and profits without limitation and
not incur the penalty unless one of the
purposes of the accumulation was tax
avoidance with respect to its shareholders. At the conclusion of its opinion in
the Donruss case, the Supreme Court
stated:
"It (the Court's holding) still serves to
isolate those cases in which tax avoidance motives did not contribute to the
decision to accumulate. Obviously, in
such a case imposition of the tax would
be futile. In addition, 'purpose' means
more than mere knowledge, ~ndoubt
edly present in nearly every case. It is
still open for the taxpayer to show that
even though knowledge of the tax consequences was present, that knowledge did

not contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings."
In Ivan Allen Co., 422 U.S. 617
(1965), the Supreme Court held that
listed and readily marketable securities
owned by that corporation (Xerox shares
valued at more than ten times cost)
were to be taken into account at their
net liquidation value rather than at cost
in applying Section 533. Appreciation
was not taken into account in determining "earnings and profits" but still was
considered in determining liquidity for
dividend purposes.
The Ivan Allen case had been h eard
by the trial court on the basis of a stipulation that, if the securities owned by
the corporation were valued at cost, the
taxpayer's earnings and profits had not
been accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the taxpayer's business.
The trial court held for the taxpayer,
but this was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in remanding the case to the trial court "for the
additional factual determination (under
Section 532(a» of whether one purpose
for tbe accumulation was to avoid income tax on behalf of the shareholders."
Prior to the enactment of the 1954
Code, the law required a corporation to
prove a lack of tax avoidance by a
"dear" preponderance of the evidence,
but this is no longer required.
Part of the Government's usual defense in this type of case is to offer evidence at the trial that, if all of the
corporation's accumulated taxable income had been distributed to the shareholders in that year, their respectiv
individual taxes would have been in·
creased substantially. Of course, this
does not necessarily indicate the prohibited purpose of avoiding the incoole
tax on the stockholders, but it is usually
possible for the Government to show
substantial increases in the taxable in·
comes of the shareholders even though
they are not in the highest brackets.
Despite the privacy statutes, courts seem
to be willing to allow the Government
to put into evidence tlle individual in·
come tax returns of the shareholder ,
even though they are not dir ct parties
to the litigation. This can be a dramatic
presentation, coupled with the implica·
tion that the Section 531 penalty is in
lieu of such individual shareholder tax
increases. It is necessary to extract from
the IRS witness the admission that the
excess earnings (less the Section 531 pen·
alty when paid) will remain in the cor-
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porate solution and will require the payment of individual taxes in the year of
distribution of such earnings.
In Starman Investment, Inc., a family
corporation wa engaged in manufacturing its own line of products and in distributing the products of a national
company. Sometime in 1967, the national company announced its desire to
distribute its own products and asked
about buying the corporate business.
The shareholders decided that it was not
feasibJ to continue in business without
distributing the national line. Therefore, in 1968, they decided to sell to the
national company all the corporation's
assets except its real state, life insurance and profit-sharing trust. Most of
the shareholders were to be employed by
the national company, but only one was
to receive an employment contract. The
company did not liquidate. It leased the
real estate to the national company and
merely put the cash proceeds in a savings account. The Service took the position that all of thc income of the corporation during the year of sale should
have been distributed to the shareholders an d, accordingly, imposed the Section 531 penalty.
The district court found as a fact that
earnings had not been permitted to
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs
of the business and also found as a fact
that tax avoidance was not one of the
motives for allowing the earnings to
accumulate.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming
the district court, detennined that such
findings of fact were not "clearly erroneous" and held:
"The government must attack both of
these findings in order to prevail on this
appeal. For even if the finding that the
earnings did not accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business is
clearly erroneous, the accumulated earnings tax does not apply so long as tax
avoidance was not a motive for the accumulation.
"Thus, we start from the premise that
even if earnings were accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the business, the result is only that the corporation must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that there was no tax
avoidance purpose for the accumula·
tion. See e.g., Ivan Allen Co. v. United
States."
Many Section 531 penalties are suggested or proposed by examining reve·
nue agents (or conferees) in an attempt
to gain the taxpayer's acceptance of

other disputed adjustments. Mo t revenue agents' reports proposing Section
531 penalties will include detailed "Bardahl" computations in an effort to show
that the earnings of a corporation have
been allowed to accumulate unreasonably. It is rare to see any mention of
tax avoidance, although it is the ultimate factual issue.
Section 534 allows the taxpayer , in
cases which may come before the Tax
Court, an opportunity to shift to the
Commissioner the burden of proving
accumulation beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. The Service will
send a notice to the taxpayer prior to
the issuance of a statutory deficiency
notice that it has an opportunity to
submit a statement setting forth the
ground or grounds on which it relies to
justify the reasonableness of its accumulations. Taxpayers responding to such
notice with a detailed statement of its
reason s [or the accumulation will usuall y
find that it achieves only one end- the
Service is able to correct any omissions
and bolster its case before issuing the
deficiency notice. The Tax Court has
shown little inclination to shift the burden of proof to the Service, despite the
furnishing of such detailed statements.
A review of Section 531 cases in the Tax
Court and the district courts and Court
of Claims indicates that the taxpayer
corporation should avoid the Tax Court
and proceed by way of the refund route
if it is to have any reasonable chance
to prevail.
The statutory presumptions are neces·
sary because of the subjective intent
factor in the tax avoidance issue, but,
keeping in mind the Donruss principle,
the taxpayer corporation still has the
opportunity to prove the lack of tax
avoidance by a preponderance of the
evidence. Although this may be a heavy
burden, it should not be shirked in an
appropriate case.

*

Cash for return of escrowed
stock okay in C reorg.
THE SOLELY·FOR· VOTING stock require·
ment of Section 368(a)(I)(C) was ruled,
in R ev. Rul. 76·334, IRB 1976·36, 8, not
to have been violated when a disputed
claim against the acquired corporation
was settled by the return of escrowed
stock of the acquiring corporation in
exchange for cash.
In R ev. Rul. 76·334, the acquiring
corporation Y, in a C reorganization
placed in escrow 10,000 shares of the Y
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voting stock to be transferred. The
escrow account was to secure Y aga in st
any breach of warranty or represen ta·
tion by X, the acquired corporation. Y
could look only to the escrowed a count
for compensation and the partie were
bound by the valuation given the es·
crowed stock at the time of the rcorgani.
zation. A dispute aro e between Y and the
shareholders of X as to whether 2,000 of
the escrowed shares should be returned
to Y. Y's claim of $20,000 contemplated
the return of 2,000 shares of the es·
crowed Y stock, based on the sto k valu·
ation set in the agreement. The current
fair market value of the Y stock had in·
creased two and one·half fold _ Y offered
to pay the former X shareholders $25,000 upon the return of the disputed
2,000 shares of stock. They accepted.
The Service ruled that the cash pay·
ment was a transaction separate from
the reorganization. As such, it did not
violate the solely.for.votin g.stock requirement. The Ruling noted that there
was no prearranged scheme for repur·
chasing the Y stock and that, in fact, the
payment arose solely out of Y's offer to
settle the dispute under the escrow
agreement. In addition, the number of
shares to be returned was fixed by the
initial negotiated value and Y could
only look to the escrowed stock for
compensation.
The shareholders of X would treat the
cash received as a redemption subject
to Section 302, of a sufficient portion of
the escrowed stock with a fair market
value equaling $25,000. This result is
based on the rationale that the escrow
transfer was sufficient to render th
former X shareholders the beneficial
owners of the stock since they had vot·
ing and dividend rights.
The return of the remaining shares
requires an adjustment of the reorgani.
zation's original purchase price. No gain
or loss is realized by the shareholders
of former corporation X. This is consistent with Rev. Rul. 76--42, wherein
escrowed stock was returned to the
acquiring corporation upon th e failure
of the acquired corporation's profits to
reach a specified point. The basis of
the forfeited shares is picked up by the
shares originally acquired in the reor·
ganization exchange.
Settlement of escrowed stock disputes
may be effected by taking into consideration a change in value of the escrowed
stock. The line between a disputed
amount of damages and the amount of
stock necessary to satisfy the underlying
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porate ownership until four years later different corporations and, therefore,
when it issued Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 according to the court, both were allowable.
-Cl
CB 46.
In the view of the court, the availability of the subsidiary's net operating loss
was dependent on the following three
events, all of which occurred after the
year of the worthless stock deduction.
1. The parent-taxpayer's willingness
DMDENDS
and capacity to place new funds at the
Cash received in merger was capital
risk of the subsidiary.
2. Timely generation of profits in the gain. (DC)
Taxpayer owned 66% of the stock of
new enterprise by the subsidiary.
NOLs do not preclude
3. The decision by the IRS or the corporation X. X was subsequently
worthlessness deduction
courts to permit the carryovers to be merged into corporation Y, a large pubANOTHER COURT has held that a corpora- used against such profits.
licly held corporation, and as a result
While the third event is no longer of the merger taxpayer r ceived common
tion can be worthless for purposes of
Section 165, even though it possesses net applicable, in view of Rev. Rul. 63-40 , stock of Y and cash. After the merger,
operating losses that can offset future the other two factors still would argue taxpayer owned less than I % of the
income. The latest case, Textron, DC for the allowability of such a loss in common stock of Y. The ommissioner
held that the cash received was taxable
R.I., 6/7/76, involved a parent corpo- similar circumstances.
In Becker, 308 F. Supp. 555 (DC eb. , as ordinary income; taxpayer sought
ration which had a wholly-owned subsidiary which operated a cruise ship, its 1970), the taxpayer attempted to deduct long-term capital gain treatment.
Held: For taxpayer. The court, citing
only asset. The taxpayer-parent eventu- the worthlessness of his stock in a corpo·
ally repossessed the ship after spending ration that had become a shell. The cor- the Supreme Court's Davis decision,
a total of nearly $6 million to make the poration later started on a profitable states that the characterization of the
subsidiary a profitable operation. The business, the income from which was boot is to be found by looking to Section 302(b)(1). The boot "is not essentaxpayer deducted this amount on its offset by its previous loss carryovers.
The court held that to accept the tially equivalent to a dividend" because
return, including a $1.3 million stock
investment, under Section 165(g)(3) IRS' position that the availability of the merger resulted in a radical change
which provides for an ordinary loss de- such carryovers precluded a finding and meaningful reduction in the nature
duction for the worthless stock of a sub- that the corporation was worthless, of taxpayer's interest in the continuing
sidiary. About a year later, the parent would be to conclude that no stock business. Therefore the cash or boot is
advanced additional funds to the sub- would ever be worthless since it would taxable as proceeds from the sale of a
sidiary and started it on a completely have potential value because of such capital asset. Shimberg, Jr., DC Fla.,
new business venture. This venture losses (at least until the losses expired) . 7/1/76.
proved successful and the subsidiary off- The court in T extron came to a similar
set the income with the net operating conclusion.
COILAPSmIUTY
losses carried over from its ship operatIn Textron, the IRS also raised the
point that to allow the subsidiary to Collapsible corporation'S gain in Section
ing days.
The Service denied the worthless offset income with its losses after the 337 liquidation was subject to tax. (TC )
Taxpayer purchased farmland and
stock loss on grounds that since the cor- parent took a worthless stock deduction
poration had the NOL carryover poten- would, in effect, permit a double deduc- buildings which it held primarily for
tial, it could not be said to have had no tion.
sale to customers in the ordinary course
The court held this argument to be of its business. In January, 1968, the
value whatsoever.
However, the court held that the without merit since the parent and the corporation contracted to sell one parcel
availability of OL carryovers by them- subsidiary were two different entities of the land and incurred expenses for
selves was not enough to substantiate a and the losses in question were incurred the construction of an access road thereclaim that the corporation had some by separate taxpayers.
on, which was completed in 1972. In
Thus, the situation here was different March, 1968, the taxpayer contemplated
value. The losses did not give the corporation value because they would not from that, for example, in Marwais Steel liquidation and on August 16, 1968, the
have been available had the subsidiary Co., 354 F.2d 997 (CA-9, 1965). There, a corporation adopted a plan of liquidabeen sold. In addition, at the time of parent corporation deducted as a bad tion and sold substantially all of the
the deduction, there was substantial debt advances to its subsidiary. It then remaining acreage. The Commissioner
doubt that the carryovers could be used liquidated the sub and tried to deduct determined that gains on the sales were
if the corporation entered a new busi- the subsidiary'S net operating losses includible in taxpayer's income because
ness. This was because the Service then against its own income. The court disal- the taxpayer was a collapsible corwas still applying Libson Shops, [nc. , lowed the deduction on the grounds poration.
353 U.S. 382 (1957), to deny carryovers that there would be a double deduction
Held: For the Commissioner. The
when a corporation entered a new by the same taxpayer for the same loss. taxpayer was availed of principally for
business. The IRS did not change its However, in Textron, the deductions the construction of property with a
position to allow losses in such a situa- for worthless stock and net operating simultaneous view toward liquidation.
tion when there was no change of cor- loss carryovers were incurred by two Taxpayer realized only an insubstantial
claim is difficult to draw. This could
make the stock value established in the
escrow agreement useless and make Rev.
Rul. 76-334's reorganization protection
unavailable. Rev. Rul. 76-42 sounds a
similar alarm when it warns that if a
shareholder benefits from an increase in
value of the escrowed stock, there
would be occasion to find a realization
of gain or loss on the forfeiture of
-Cl
escrowed stock.

Netf) decisions

New corporate decisions
amount (9.3%) of its total taxable
income from the property prior to forming the intent to liquidate. Manassas
Airport Industrial Park, I nc., 66 TC
No. 55.

Tax Court finds corporation collapsible. (TCM)
T axpayers fonned a corporation to acquire land and to construct, own, and
operate an apartment development.
Commissioner contended that it was a
collapsible corporation.
Held: For the Commission er. On the
record the court found that various distributions made to the shareholders
prior to the corporation's r alization of
a substantial amount of the income to
be derived (rom the property, had been
contemplated prior to completion of
construction. Zorn, TCM 1976·241.

LIQUIDATIO S
Ordinary expense deduction allowed
f()J' expenses attributable to sale of assets
in a Section J)7 corporate liquidation.
(DC)
Citing Mountain States Mixed Feed
Co., 365 F.2d 244 (CA-lO, 1966), ta xpayer
contended that it was entitled to an
ordinary e 'pense deduction for expenses
attributable to the sale of assets in con·
nection with a 337 liquidation.
Held: For taxpayer. Benedict Oil Co.,
DC Okla., 7/ I / 76.
Acquiescence announcement.
Pre-liquidation income allocated between
corporation and shareholders. A corporation distributed as part of a liqui.
dation two distribution contracts, fo r
a motion picture and a television pro·
gram. Payments on the contracts attributable to periods prior to the liquidation were taxable to the corporation.
The shareholders, as transferees, are Ii·
able for the tax thereon but may deduct
such taxes as a loss in the year paid. In·
come from later contract payments, taxable to the shareholders, may not be
reported on the cost recovery method.
Schneider, 65 TC 18 (1975), acq. IRB
1976-3 1,5.

D made cash advances and guarantees
of loans to C in order to provide working capital. D had to make good on
some guarantees, and in 1970 sold C at
a loss. D claimed an ordinary loss, while
the Commissioner contended that th e loss
was capital.
Held: For the Commissioner. The
stock of C was a capital asset, obtained
by D for an investment, not to assure a

supply of computer programmers for
D's own operations. The stock did not
become wholely worthless prior to the
sale in 1970, thus Section 165(g)(3) was
unavailable. Advances and payments on
guarantees were contributions to capital, added to stock basis, not debts.
Thus, all losses are capital, subject to
the limitations thereon. Datamation
Services, Inc. TCM 1976·252.

TAx MANAGEMENT
We are pleased to advise the profession of the recent addition to the
Foreign Income Series of the foJlowing Portfolios :
BrESS OPERATION IN FRANCE
By: 1. C. Goldsmith, Esq.
of
Goldsmith , Delvolve & Associates
Paris, France
B 51

OPERATIONS I ARGENTI A
By: Dr. Adolfo Atchabahian
of
University oj Buenos A ires
Buenos Aires, Argentina

CO TROLLED FOREIGN CORPORA TIO - SECTIO
By: Hans P eter Olsen, Esq.
of
Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons
Providence, Rhode Island
and
Alan G. Choate, Esq.
of
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
FOREIG

954

I COME- SECTIO 482-ALLOCATIONS
By: Joseph E. Ruffalo
and
Julius Isaacs, C.P.A.
of
New York, .Y.

These Portfolios are available as a part of Ta Management's continuing
program, presently encompassing some 300 specific problem areas of
Federal income, estate, gift, trust, and foreign bu siness taxation. If
further information is desired, please write to Tax 1anagement Inc. , a
division of The Bureau of ational Affairs, Inc.

THIN CAPITALIZATIO

THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.
tockholdings and cash advances are
capital investments; losses resulting me
cap~tal. (TCM)
In 196.9 D, a computer programming
firm, acquired C, which operated computer training schools. During 1969-70

Dept. TMF.601-JT
1231 25th Street, N.W.
Washi'ngton, D.C. 20037
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